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With the concepts of cause and effect 




In an interview with Thomas S. Kuhn, the physicist-philosopher Philipp Frank recalls his early years at the Institute of Physics of the University of Vienna where he had studied under Boltzmann and where he became a Privatdozent in 1909. 

Also, strange as it was, in Vienna the physicists were all followers of Mach and Boltzmann. It wasn’t the case that people would hold any antipathy against Boltzmann’s theory because of Mach. And I don’t even think that Mach had any antipathy. At least it did not play as important a role as is often thought. I was always interested in the problem, but it never occurred to me that because of the theories of Mach one shouldn’t pursue the theories of Boltzmann. (quoted from Blackmore 1995a, 128) 

In a letter to Arthur Eddington written in 1940, Erwin Schrödinger gives a similar testimony. Schrödinger who was three years younger than Frank had begun his studies by the time of Boltzmann’s death and he stayed at the Institute of Physics as an assistant of the experimental physicist Franz Serafin Exner until Exner became emeritus in 1920.

Filled with a great admiration of the candid and incorruptible struggle for truth in both of them, we did not consider them irreconcilable. Boltzmann’s ideal consisted in forming absolutely clear, almost naively clear and detailed ‘pictures’ – mainly in order to be quite sure of avoiding contradictory assumptions. Mach’s ideal was the cautious synthesis of observational facts that can, if desired, be traced back till the plain, crude sensual perception. … However, we decided for ourselves that these were just different methods of attack, and that one was quite permitted to follow one or the other provided one did not lose sight of the important principles … of the other one. (quoted from Moore 1989, 41).

Quite contrary to this synthesis whose elaboration shall be a major objective of the present paper, most German physicists shared Arnold Sommerfeld’s view that during the famous polemics on the 1895 Naturforscherversammlung, “Mach’s natural philosophy stood at the back” (quoted from Broda 1955, 12) of Helm and Ostwald’s energeticism and against Boltzmann’s atomistic. Max Planck, who would become the explicit and implicit counterpart of the tradition of Vienna Indeterminism studied in the present paper, by then entertained a neutral position emphasizing that both the first and the second law of thermodynamics were independent principles which were not reducible to molecular motions. Although his discovery of the law of radiation in 1900 chiefly contributed in turning the tide in favor of Boltzmann, Planck needed some time to fully reconcile himself with the probabilistic nature of the second law.​[2]​ One aspect, however, he tried to avoid at least until it became almost inevitable with the advent of quantum theory, to wit, the idea that the most basic laws of nature are indeterministic. 
	In his 1908 Leiden lecture which launched the heavy polemics with Mach, Planck praises as Boltzmann’s lifework “the emancipation of the concept of entropy from the human art of experimentation” (Planck 1908, 14), that is, from the impossibility of a perpetuum mobile of the second kind. The price of this seminal step was to render the second law a merely probabilistic regularity that admitted exceptions – at least in principle.

Boltzmann has drawn therefrom the conclusion that such strange events contradicting the second law of thermodynamics could well occur in nature, and he accordingly left some room for them in his physical world view. To my mind, this is, however, a matter in which one does not have to comply with him. For, a nature in which such events happen … would no longer be our nature. … Boltzmann himself has formulated that condition for gas theory [which excludes these phenomena], it is generally speaking the ‘hypothesis of elementary disorder’. … By introducing this condition the necessity of all natural events is restored. (Ibid., 15)

Even after quantum mechanics had become generally accepted, Planck emphasized the importance of neatly separating between necessity (dynamical laws) and probability (statistical laws). Physical science, so Planck declared, cannot content itself with statistical explanations that are not in turn explained in terms of more fundamental dynamical laws because any science needs a solid foundation. Planck thus listed Boltzmann as an ally in his polemics against Mach because the former achieved the de-anthropomorphization of the entropy concept and made an important step toward a stable and unified physical world-view. In his lecture, Planck depicted Mach’s epistemology almost as a brand of sensationalism that is – albeit logically coherent – entirely fruitless for physical science. Instead, progress in that discipline is grounded in our belief in the reality of physical objects, such as atoms. In his reply to Mach’s rejoinder (1910), Planck (1910) criticized that the principle of economy represented a practical rule that had been elevated to a metaphysical principle. He, moreover, charged Mach of ignorance in thermodynamical matters, in particular, by conflating both laws of thermodynamics – an error that was quite common among energeticists. As John Heilbron (1988, Ch. II, 1) rightly observes, these polemics earned Planck also a certain reputation as a philosopher of nature. Taking into account his increasing influence within almost all scientific organizations and learned societies, Planck can be safely considered as the philosophical opinion leader among German physicists at least until the end of the 1920s.
	Where do these serious divergences concerning Boltzmann’s philosophical legacy originate? How deep is the rift between Mach and Boltzmann and why could it be conceived so differently in Vienna and in Berlin? Typically, comparisons between Mach and Boltzmann start from the notorious fight about the existence of atoms, emphasize Mach’s anti-realism, and subsequently elaborate on Boltzmann’s rather intricate form of realism. John Blackmore (1995b), who seems to be somewhat perplexed about Frank’s record,​[3]​ has recently diagnosed a substantial shift towards metaphysical realism in Boltzmann’s late works from 1900 until his death in 1906. Yet in his lecture notes on natural philosophy (Fasol-Boltzmann 1990)and in other documents of the time Boltzmann explicitly endorsed several aspects of Mach’s epistemology. Precisely one of them, or so I will argue, constitutes the reason why such different readings of Boltzmann’s major scientific achievement could arise. 
	Mach’s replacing the concept of causality by the notion of functional dependences between sensory elements made it viable to contemplate indeterminism at the most basic level of reality. While Boltzmann endorsed Mach’s improvement of the Humean approach, Planck and most other German physicists treated causality still within a Kantian framework as an a priori precondition of scientific knowledge. On their account, only such objects which fell under this category, that is, which obeyed deterministic laws, could ultimately be considered as an element of empirical reality. This reality criterion did not entail that concepts of probabilistic nature, such as entropy, were downgraded to mere auxiliary concepts, but scientists’ quest for explanation could not halt at this point. This Kantian approach yielded an rigid and permanent connection between causality and realism because there was no way to obtain the basic concepts of reality independently of the category of causality. Mach’s wider notion of causality severed this bond between causality and realism on the general level and, accordingly, permitted to a whole group of physicists, who had been educated at the Vienna Institute of Physics, to seek reality criteria according to the needs of the theory they intended to formulate. Thus, on the special level, i.e., for a single theory, the separated issues of causal laws and ontology had to be mutually adjusted. 
	The important consequence of this separation was that it became possible to define a satisfactory ontology for a genuinely indeterministic theory long before the advent of quantum mechanics. In a recent paper (Stöltzner 1999) I have called this philosophical tradition Vienna Indeterminism and I have given an account of its first phase that comprises Mach, Boltzmann, and Exner.​[4]​ The temporal starting point of Vienna Indeterminism lies between the year 1896 when Boltzmann’s Lectures on Gas Theory (????) appeared and the year 1903 when he started his philosophy lectures at the University of Vienna. Due to his central position within the Vienna Institute of Physics and because of his captivating personality, Exner could convey that rather Machian reading of Boltzmann’s late philosophy to the younger generation which is expressed in the quotations from Frank and Schrödinger. This second phase of Vienna Indeterminism contains two branches: (a) In the 1920s Schrödinger follows rather closely Exner’s way of thinking, but he subsequently develops a rather unique philosophy of quantum mechanics (Cf. Bitbol 1996). (b) More than Schrödinger, Philipp Frank and his close friend, the applied mathematician Richard von Mises were oriented to French conventionalism and advocated the logical analysis of scientific language. Their views are the main topic of the present paper, and I introduce Schrödinger’s position only insofar it is discussed by Frank and von Mises. But, of course, the linchpin of my thesis is the continuity and integrity of Vienna Indeterminism. Thus, I first of all give a brief outline of the whole tradition and its context before I discuss Exner’s synthesis (Section 2) and the positions of Frank and von Mises until the formal foundation of the Vienna Circle in 1929 (Section 3). 
	This temporal restriction excludes both Frank and von Mises’ seminal books (Frank 1932 and Mises 1939), but not primarily for lack of space. Rather do I intend to locate the tradition of Vienna Indeterminism and the discussion with its critics within one particular journal that – in a very general sense – was the forum for the pro-scientific part of the German-speaking intellectual community. In 1913 the weekly magazine Die Naturwissenschaften was founded as a German analogue to Nature mainly on the initiative of the physicist and retired manager Arnold Berliner. From 1924 it also became the official organ of the venerable Gesellschaft Deutscher Naturforscher und Ärzte and of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Gesellschaft. Like these societies, Die Naturwissenschaften emphasized the integrity of all natural sciences and rejected both the anti-scientific cultural tendencies prevailing among many German intellectuals and anti-modernist trends within science, such as Lenard’s Deutsche Physik. Apart from survey articles on the progress of various disciplines that were often written by the most renowned German-speaking scientists, Die Naturwissenschaften also published papers on philosophy of science. Logical Empiricists broadly used this journal as a medium until 1935 when Berliner was forced to resign on racial grounds. For the scientists within the Vienna Circle, it was even the most important philosophical forum before the foundation of Erkenntnis in 1930 (Stöltzner 2000, Ch. 4). Thus, if one succeeds to establish the integrity of the tradition of Vienna Indeterminism within this forum, one can conclude that it appeared so for a rather broad audience. The same holds for the continuity in the philosophical views of the members of this tradition from the end of the energetics controversy until 1929 when quantum mechanics necessitated a radical shift in attitude towards causality. Another reason for this sociological contextualization is the notorious Forman thesis (1971) claiming a causal influence of the socio-cultural milieu of the early Weimar republic on physicists’ suddenly converting to indeterminism. After three decades of controversy an argument as the one outlined here which contradicts Forman’s results by establishing a far-reaching continuity of the philosophical discourse, cannot relapse into internalist considerations (Cf. Stöltzner 2000). 

1. A synopsis of Vienna Indeterminism, its Critics and Limits

Vienna Indeterminism was made possible by Mach’s redefinition of causality in terms of functional dependences between sensory elements. Mach’s ontology was based on facts which are constituted by relatively stable complexes of such functional relations. Going beyond Hume, Mach expressed them in terms of concrete physical equations, for instance, “Fourier’s equations which comprise all conceivable facts of heat conduction” (Mach 1919, 461f./415). He calls these laws direct descriptions and opposes them to indirect descriptions, such as atomistic theories, which are only of hypothetical validity. But in order to guarantee the integrity of those functionally constituted facts, Mach had to posit a principle of unique determination of the actual fact in comparison to all variations of its functional dependences. Mach also introduced another core tenet of Vienna Indeterminism by emphasizing that for the empiricist it is impossible to finally decide between determinism and indeterminism on the metaphysical level. Nevertheless, he still favored determinism as a regulative principle because only by way of this hypothesis could probabilities make sense. While Mach thus agreed with his opponent Planck that all probabilities required a determinist foundation, Boltzmann was surprisingly vague with respect to the concept of probability. He simultaneously clung to the old concept of equiprobability – which is either based on causal relations or on their absence due to our ignorance – and emphasized against Planck – though mostly in private communications – that the highly improbable entropy-decreasing events really occur. Boltzmann main objective was, however, to give a proper ontology to atoms by means of a twofold reality criterion. On the one hand, he conceived of atomism as property reduction to theoretically defined universal entities and their interactions. On the other hand, atomism was already implied by humans’ finitary reasoning powers that made it impossible to actually assess the continuum. At this point, Boltzmann surprisingly endorsed Mach’s definition of mathematics as “economically ordered experience of counting” (Mach 1919, 68/70).​[5]​ Moreover, he skillfully integrated Mach’s empiricism into his struggles against energeticism.​[6]​
	Viewing Boltzmann’s conceptual difficulties with probability and atomistic ontology, it is rather surprising that he never adopted nor even cited Gustav Theodor Fechner’s frequency interpretation of probability published in 1897. Shortly after Boltzmann’s death this interpretative move was accomplished by Exner in his 1908 inaugural speech as Rector of the University of Vienna, and it became henceforth pivotal for Vienna Indeterminism. As Exner built physical ontology upon collectives, he had to defend a rather firm empiricism in Mach’s footsteps because only in this way could he jettison as meaningless all speculations as to whether there exist some unobservable deterministic laws at the most basic level of physical reality. In his polemics against Planck, Exner emphasized that all apparently deterministic laws could well be the macroscopic limit of indeterministic basic laws valid for the single particles or events. Exner’s synthesis between Mach and Boltzmann paved the way to accept genuine indeterminism in physics without any reference to quantum mechanics. Exner’s reliance upon the second law of thermodynamics did not halt at the boundaries of physics proper. By the end of his life he had completed a comprehensive physicalist and indeterministic theory of culture (Exner 1926) which remained unpublished but gives vivid testimony of the cultural discussions in the large circle around Exner. (Cf. Stöltzner 2002b)
	The reception of Exner’s philosophical ideas was typically limited to those who had closer contacts to the Vienna physics community. Among them was Exner’s long-time assistant Schrödinger, who constantly stressed Exner’s priority in contemplating genuinely indeterministic laws of nature, in particular in his 1922 Zurich inaugural lecture “What is a law of nature?”. Schrödinger also followed Mach’s neutral monism by developing a pronounced unease against the Copenhagen interpretation’s dualism between observations and an objective particle reality unknowable in principle. Quite in line with Vienna Indeterminism Schrödinger was searching for a realist but not metaphysically realist ontology for his wave equation which came close to Boltzmann’s universal atomistic pictures; yet neither the wave function nor – in later years – unified field theory turned out to be satisfactory. In 1927 Schrödinger took Planck’s chair at the University of Berlin and in 1929 he became a member of the Prussian Academy of Sciences. In his inaugural speech to the academy (1929) he continues Exner’s debate with Planck, but whereas in 1922 he had considered the alternative between determinism and indeterminism as an empirical question – as had Exner – now he took a conventionalist tack and considered it a matter of practicability.
	French conventionalism was, on the other hand, rather the starting point for the Vienna Circle members Frank and von Mises. I will discuss their positions together not only because of their common intellectual background, but particularly because of the manifold of affirmative cross-references in their works. This intimate connection justifies enrolling – at least for the scope of the present paper – von Mises in the Vienna Circle. Back in 1907 Frank had considered the general law of causality as a mere convention, a position he largely revoked in his 1932 book The Law of Causality and its Limits where he investigates the conditions under which the general law of causality attains an empirical content. As a matter of fact, the earlier position was hardly reconcilable with Mises and Frank’s constant adherence to Mach. In the introduction to his book, Frank emphasized that his change of mind was caused by quantum theory and by von Mises’ “conception of statistical laws and their relation to dynamic laws” (Frank 1932, 12). To von Mises’ mind, the two types of law did not actually compete with one another because they simply concerned different observational facts. The law of causality obtains empirical content only once it has been specified by means of certain axioms, such as the differential equations of Newtonian mechanics. Just as the Newtonian dynamical laws govern the motions of point particles, statistical laws deal with mass phenomena which are represented by statistical collectives. Mises (1922) explicitly criticizes Boltzmann’s formulation of the second law as a blend of microdeterminism and macroprobabilism and advocates a purely probabilistic approach instead. Mises and Frank gained this freedom in choosing collectives as a proper ontology by applying the idea that all concepts in physical theories are coordinated to specific observations or measurements. Thus, Frank could argue that the only modification in quantum mechanics was the statistical character of this coordination. When he demanded that, nevertheless, coordination and statistical law had to be unique this can be viewed as an heir of Mach’s principle of unique determination. Finally Exner, Frank, and Mises never opted for a final decision between determinism and indeterminism; thus they did not show much sympathy for modifying logic under the influence of quantum mechanics.
	Vienna Indeterminism ends in 1939 when von Mises’ textbook on Positivism was published. Moreover, at the same time a far-reaching convergence between Logical Empiricists and Ernst Cassirer, the heir of Marburg neo-Kantianism, became manifest. In many respects Cassirer’s 1937 book Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik can be considered as a chronicle of the epoch studied here and as a justification of bestowing on Mach the honor of having given birth to Vienna Indeterminism. Cassirer emphasizes that the gist of the matter lies in the distinction between causality and the object figuring in the laws. He traces this thesis back to his 1910 book Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff, which had focused on the dissolution of substantialism in modern philosophy, a tendency which also provides the background of Mach’s reinterpretation of causality. Although, in the end, Cassirer like the late Planck opts for maintaining a strongly relativized a priori notion of causality, Frank’s review of the book is very laudatory, and he spots there the core tenet of Vienna Indeterminism.

A further principal feature of Cassirer’s account is that the form of the law of causality and the concepts of what one calls an object mutually presuppose each other. Also this is a basic thesis defended by logical empiricism which has been taken over from positivism. Today’s positivism just gives this thesis a more formal turn. (Frank 1938, 73)

This convergence of Cassirer’s neo-Kantian position to Logical Empiricists’ epistemology is important because Vienna Indeterminism cannot be considered as a well-entrenched Lakatosian research program let alone as a fixed set of philosophical assertions. It lacks a precisely defined philosophical core that is tenaciously defended throughout the years because apart from their separation from causality the respective reality criteria are starkly different. After all, the tradition extends over half a century during which two major scientific revolutions took place, relativity and quantum theory. There are, however, further cohesive traits, such as a firm empiricist attitude and a high esteem for statistical physics in general.​[7]​ But in order to fully prove the existence of such an adaptable tradition, a historical contextualization is wanted that permits one to circumscribe Vienna Indeterminism by its limits, in particular its opponents and allies, and by investigating its institutional and personal basis. 
	To start with the second question, basically two institutions were carrying the tradition’s continuity from the first to the second phase. Founded already in 1850 for Christian Doppler, the Institute of Physics of the University of Vienna was constantly suffering from scarcity of funds. Moreover, neither Josef Stefan nor Josef Loschmidt ever traveled abroad to attend scientific conferences. Both factors – so Boltzmann judges in his obituaries – prevented some possible experimental breakthroughs and lessened their international recognition. But, the spirit was remarkable: “Never did they attempt to express their intellectual superiority in academic conventions. Albeit a student at first and then a long-time assistant, I have never heard from them any word other than the friend addresses the friend.”(Boltzmann 1905, 102)​[8]​ When Stefan and Loschmidt died in 1893 and 1895, this intellectual atmosphere continued under their successors Boltzmann and Exner. In particular Exner exhibited an extraordinary understanding for younger people. By the time of Boltzmann’s death, he “was surrounded by a bevy of pupils who respected him like a father.” (Benndorf 1927, 403) In this way, Exner became “during one generation the center of Austria’s physical life.” (Sommerfeld 1927, 27) Thus, it seems reasonable to suppose that this climate strongly fostered the spread of Exner’s synthesis of Mach and Boltzmann among the students of the Institute of Physics. Let me illustrate this by two appraisals of Exner’s personality and achievements written by members of the second phase of Vienna Indeterminism.
	In his inaugural address to the Prussian Academy of Sciences, Schrödinger asserts: “Franz Exner (to whom I am personally indebted for his exceptionally great support) was the first who contemplated the possibility of an acausal conception of nature.”(1929, 732) Also Frank acknowledges Exner’s priority in this respect: 

Franz Exner has already drawn attention to the possibility that elementary processes do not follow the pattern of celestial mechanics with their Laplacian causality but that perhaps for an individual event, for example the collision of two molecules, no causal law can be established at all, and that nevertheless, with the formation of averages, laws can be derived by which some causal determination is expressed. (1932, 70-71)

In a footnote Frank mentions Schrödinger’s 1922 lecture where “the significance of Exner’s thoughts for our time is very correctly characterized.” (Ibid., 284) Two chapters further he extends this line of thought to von Mises:

The statistical conception … suggested that the statement of Newton’s equations of motion for each individual molecule [in a gas]…is not a statement about the real world at all. However this would mean, as Exner already has declared possible, that the proposition that mechanical causality exists for each individual particle of arbitrarily small size is not a statement about reality but can have concrete meaning only as a tautology…Perhaps Richard von Mises was the first who has pointed out, in his lecture ‘On the present crises of mechanics’ that in the field of mechanics in the narrower sense, there are observable processes in liquid and solid bodies that also cannot easily be presented with the help of causal laws. (Ibid., 72)

The more detailed discussion to come will show that Exner was indeed the connecting link between both phases of Vienna Indeterminism. 
	The second institution of relevance is of a rather informal kind. In Modern Science and its Philosophy, Frank related that from 1907 until his departure for Prague in 1912 he met with Neurath, Hahn, and others every Thursday night in a Vienna coffee house. Friedrich Stadler (2001, 143) also lists von Mises among this group which Rudolf Haller (1986b) has baptized as the ‘First Vienna Circle’. Without entering the debate whether its importance for the history of Logical Empiricism suggests this or another name, I view in this circle a well-documented cohesive factor for Frank and von Mises’ philosophical formation that was close to the Institute of Physics and that was embedded into other Viennese intellectual fora. One can safely assume that during 1903-1906 not only Frank attended Boltzmann’s lectures on natural philosophy. Apparently then, their content did not quite appeal to the coffee house circle; Frank curtly remarks that “the effect of the course was slight, because of a lack of coherent approach”(Frank 1961, 244). According to his account, they were mainly interested in French conventionalism and Mach’s historical-critical analyses of the physical science which, so one should add, better suited relativity theory, the field which after the end of the energetics controversy had become pivotal in philosophy of science. Moreover, special relativity was Frank’s area of research​[9]​ which would earn him the Prague chair in 1912. Before that Frank had done mathematically-oriented work in the calculus of variations, a topic to which he had most probably been introduced by Kahn as early as in 1905 when he was writing his Ph.D. dissertation (Frank 1906). Interestingly, Exner was one of two experimentalists who wrote the opinion about Frank’s thesis instead of the deceased supervisor Boltzmann. (Cf. Stöltzner 2002a) As to the wider context of the ‘First Vienna Circle’, Thomas Uebel (2000 and 2002) rightly emphasizes the importance of Adolf Höfler’s Philosophical Society at the University of Vienna where Frank, Hahn and Neurath started their philosophical careers and where they received a very specific reading of Kant.
	Haller places the First Vienna Circle within ‘Austrian philosophy’ (Haller, 1986a), an intellectual tradition prevailing in the Habsburg monarchy since the days of Bernard Bolzano. One of its major characteristics was the rejection of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, a point that also appears in the 1929 manifesto of the Vienna Circle and figures quite prominently in Neurath’s later historical writings. Whatever stand one takes with respect to the Neurath-Haller theses in general, one point is essential to properly locate Vienna Indeterminism within this general context. Together with modern logic, general relativity became crucial to the philosophical identity of the Vienna Circle and of Logical Empiricism in general. By the early 1920s, also the Germans Moritz Schlick and Hans Reichenbach – general relativity’s most prominent philosophical defenders – who had grown up in a milieu shaped by neo-Kantianism, arrived at the rejection of any aprioristic conceptions of space and time however relativized. Yet the causality debate developed in a rather different fashion, and the Kantian category of causality enjoyed a surprising longevity despite the general ban against the synthetic a priori prevailing within the Vienna Circle.. In particular the main defender of deterministic Kantian causality in physics, Max Planck, was at the same time mainly responsible for getting both relativity theories accepted by the German physics community. As a matter of fact, Planck’s interpretation of relativity was plainly anti-Machian, since he believed that outdated absolute concepts are relativized just in order to find deeper absolute concepts. “Yet when space and time have been denied the character of being absolute, the absolute has not been blotted out, it has just been moved more backward, to wit, into the metric of the four-dimensional manifold.” (Planck 1925, 154) Planck’s convergent realism manifest in this passage was fundamentally at odds with the highly flexible reality criterion used by the Vienna Indeterminists. Roughly speaking, the front-line on causality went right through the Logical Empiricist camp separating the Viennese from the Germans. The situation changed, however, after quantum mechanics had made it close to inevitable to consider irreducibly statistical micro-laws. When both sides came closer to one another in the 1930s, the convergence of position also embraced neo-Kantians such as Cassirer. At the end of this introductory section, I shall sketch why Schlick and Reichenbach albeit two of the most prominent Logical Empiricists did not belong to Vienna Indeterminism. This permits me to draw the philosophical border line of Vienna Indeterminism without invoking the Austrian philosophy thesis in a determinative fashion.
	Schlick’s first paper on causality (1920) was almost exclusively directed at relativity theory which did not force him to accept genuine indeterminism. On this account, the statistical character of the second law was not situated in the laws themselves, but in the initial conditions – quite analogous to the relation between the dynamics (the time evolution) and the initial value hypersurface in general relativity.​[10]​ Still in 1925, Schlick argued quite in line with his teacher Planck that “[t]he validity of causality is thus a presupposition, not an object, of the natural sciences” (1925, 429/31). Moreover, “[i]t is clear…that only in utmost extremity will the scientist or philosopher resolve to postulate purely statistical micro-laws” (Ibid., 461/61). When in 1926 this emergency case had happened, Schlick renounced his earlier attempts to provide an explicitly characterization of causal laws and turned to scientific practice. “Verification as such, the fulfilment of prediction, confirmation in experience, is therefore the criterion of causality per se.” (1931, 151/188) Unlike the Vienna Indeterminists, Schlick admitted a logical notion of probability when describing human judgments, but he clearly set this apart from the objective notion of probability occurring in physics.
	What separates Reichenbach from Vienna Indeterminism is precisely that he did not assume such a distinction and in this way claimed to possess a probabilistic solution to the problem of induction. Here I cannot enter into this vast topic which led to many polemics with his Berlin colleague von Mises, which ultimately estranged him from the movement in the 1930s, and which may be one of the motivations why he – unlike Frank and von Mises – turned to quantum logic. But I do not pass over the fact that in the first footnote of his Philosophic Foundations of Quantum Mechanics Reichenbach lists Exner as “perhaps the first” (Reichenbach 1965, 1) to have criticized the assumption of strict causality. The author knew well what he was talking about because he had reviewed the first edition of Exner’s Lectures on the Physical Foundations of Science published in 1917. The reviewer endorsed “Exner’s unequivocally advocating the objective meaning of the probabilistic laws in which he rightly conceives a very general regularity of nature” (Reichenbach 1921, 415). This was, of course, also Reichenbach’s own position (1920a & 1920b). It is high time now to look into Exner’s works themselves and to study their premises and intellectual roots.

2. Exner’s synthesis and its Roots

On September 8th, 1906, the morning edition of the Neue Freie Presse published two obituaries of Boltzmann on its front page. While Mach praises the deceased as an unparalleled experimenter, Exner focused on the atomistic world view, “in which he found the best mainstay in the struggle against the lately popular, but unclear ideas of energeticism…Against all these theories which signify, in effect, a step backward, Boltzmann fought a stubborn, but righteous and meritorious struggle in which his sharp mathematical weapons always led him to victory.” In Boltzmann’s philosophical armory one finds Mach’s anti-substantialism, too: 

as regards Ostwald’s energetics, I think it rests merely on a misunderstanding of Mach’s ideas. Mach pointed out that we are only given the law-like course of our sense impressions and ideas, whereas all physical magnitudes, atoms, molecules, forces, energies and so on are mere concepts for the economical representation and illustration of these law-like relations of our sense impressions and ideas. The last are thus the only thing that exists in the first instance, physical concepts being merely mental additions of our own. Ostwald understood only one half of this proposition, namely that atoms did not exist; at once he asked: what then does exist? To this his answer was that it was energy that existed. In my view this answer is quite opposed to Mach’s outlook. (Boltzmann 1905, 368/175f.)

These mentally added concepts, on Boltzmann’s account, enjoyed much more freedom than within Mach’s adaptive epistemology. Theories could well reach beyond the known phenomena, they were not just their economization.​[11]​ By separating clearly the facts and the theories, Boltzmann could better avail himself of the Machian conception of functional dependences as an ontological basis for physical theory. He even defended atomism on this line by considering atoms as the result of a reduction of properties to universal basic entities. Boltzmann’s ideas about causality largely agreed with Mach’s, and he treated the classical metaphysical question as a pseudo-problem. We are “free to denote [the law of causality] either as the precondition of all experience or as itself an experience we have in conjunction with every other.” (Ibid., 163/75) When Mach diagnosed our ‘desire for causality’, Boltzmann discerned a general tendency of all our mental habits to ‘overshoot the mark’ by still seeking explanation or definition of the inexplicable elementary concepts. 

Indeed people racked their brains over the question whether cause and effect represent a necessary link or merely an accidental sequence, whereas one can sensibly ask only whether a specific phenomenon is always linked with a definite group of others, being their necessary consequence, or whether this group may at times be absent. (Ibid., 354/166)

This language-critical motive would become a core tenet of the Vienna Circle. In a fragment for the philosophy lectures bearing the heading “Cause and Effect”, Boltzmann links causality to probability.

Before any experience takes place, each [an accidental sequence or a causal link between phenomena] is equally probable. But my repeated experiences render it infinitely improbable that all observed regularity would be accidental, and infinitely probable that actual actually takes place. (Fasol-Boltzmann 1990, 282)

Still at this time, Boltzmann considered probability as degree of certainty and he seems to have approved the logical interpretation of Johannes von Kries whose seminal book (Kries 1886) he quoted in the same year, but never afterwards. Applying logical probability, however, requires “that the mechanical conditions of the system are known” (Boltzmann 1905, 37/22). As Martin Klein (1973) has convincingly shown, Boltzmann made several major changes in his use of the concept of probability.
	But despite these modifications, developing statistical mechanics as a ‘special science’ that studies “the properties of a complex of very many mechanical systems starting from the most varied initial conditions” (Boltzmann, 1905, 360/171) was constantly aggravated by obtaining a proper concept of equiprobability. “However, this being the fundamental concept, it cannot in turn be derived and must be regarded as given.”(Ibid., 361/171) On January, 31st, 1906, Boltzmann’s notes for the philosophy class read as such:

Knowledge by the law of causality not in the same way from experience. Source of experience. We stand​[12]​ under its influence. One seeks probability from a priori probability. [This] only [makes] sense, if equally possible cases. Necessarily subjective from our classifications or after known causal law. (1990, 145)

To my mind, Boltzmann here argues that in the same way as we necessarily order experiences by (functional) causality, we pose equiprobabilities in order to base probabilistic laws. Both are achieved either by classifications, e.g. the symmetry of a die, or according to already empirically known laws, such as: “We can infer from experience that in lotto every move is equally probable.”(1905, 163/75)
	Yet Boltzmann never made the final step in basing probability on experience although in a letter to Felix Klein in 1899 he expressed his misgivings about Emanuel Czuber’s abstract definition of the object of probability calculus (Cf. Höflechner 1994, II 318). He evidently was not acquainted with Fechner’s relative frequency interpretation of probability posthumously published in the Kollektivmaßlehre of 1897 that would fit so neatly to his own definition of statistical mechanics as a special science quoted above. Shortly after Boltzmann’s death, “about 1908 Fechner’s theory of collectives apparently was standard knowledge for everyone working on probability theory and statistics in the German-speaking area” (Heidelberger 1993, 376). 
	Why did Boltzmann never read Fechner? An argument with Mach who conceived Fechner’s global tendency to stability as the origin of the second law teaches that this neglect was a generic one on Boltzmann’s side.​[13]​ Thus instead of referring to Boltzmann’s weak sight in his later years, I think that Heidelberger is quite right to argue that Fechner’s thoughts about probability were too much embedded into his general and often hermetic outlook to be quickly accessible for someone who was – in stark contrast to Mach – unfamiliar with their philosophical context.​[14]​
	Exner, to the contrary, was familiar with this context. In his curriculum for the Austrian Academy of Sciences he writes: 

It was perhaps an unconscious tradition [of Franz Serafin’s deceased father Franz Exner (1802-1853) who was a professor of philosophy at Prague] that I felt the wish to occupy myself with purely philosophical problems, such as, e.g., in particular with Herbart’s system, especially with his psychology and metaphysics. (1917, 3)

It is safe to conclude that Exner also studied Fechner’s manifold criticisms of Herbart.​[15]​ Moreover, his elder brother Sigmund was a world-renowned physiologist and held a chair at the University of Vienna as well. 
	Franz Exner did not miss the best opportunity to set forth his philosophical outlook. On October, 15th, 1908, he delivered his inaugural address as Rector of the University of Vienna “On Laws in Science and Humanistics”.​[16]​ Like Mach and Boltzmann, Exner denies any irreconcilable difference between science and the humanities that would justify different methods; instead the two only study different kinds of objects. Still, while the sciences possess mathematically formalizable and universal laws, the humanities obtain weak regularities at best. Exner tackles this classical problem from an unusual perspective: Why do natural laws exist at all? He asserts that all processes in nature fall under the laws of physics. Yet he combines Boltzmann’s physicalism with Mach’s anti-substantialism; “these laws do not exist in nature, only man formulates them and avails himself of them as linguistic and calculatory means.”(Exner 1909, 7) 
	Looking around us, we do not at first discern any lawlike regularities, but rather the fact that all natural processes are directed. Here Exner pays tribute to Boltzmann who “was the first to give a definite and clear interpretation of this direction…showing that the world ceaselessly develops from less probable into more probable, and hence more stable, states.” (Ibid., 9f.) In the molecular dynamics of a gas we “observe regularities produced exclusively by chance.” (Ibid., 13) But highly probable states, viz. stable laws, are only possible for an extremely large number of individual events. All such laws are thus average laws which only hold with high probability, such that there can never be mathematically exact laws. 
	Throwing two dice sufficiently often we see the more probable numbers of spots to occur more frequently. This manifests the law of large numbers which is “unprovable but taken from the thousandfold experience of men and constitutes the basis of probability calculus. As the one and only law it indeed governs all happenings in nature.” (Ibid., 19) But this meta-law only holds if external conditions do not change until sufficiently many individual events have occurred for the exact (but not exceptionless) average laws to stabilize. 
	Adopting as early as 1908 the relative frequency interpretation of probability represents Exner’s most important contribution to Vienna Indeterminism. In the fourth chapter of his 1917 Lectures titled “On Natural Laws”, Exner gives an introduction to probability calculus and emphasizes that only if we consider chance not as based on ‘imperfect knowledge’, but as an objective feature of nature, can we reconcile chance and causality by considering the law of causality as expressing that “on average the course of the phenomena is lawful.” (1922, 675) Exner adopts Mach’s redefinition of causality in terms of functional dependences and writes: “Ernst Mach to whom one surely must attribute an influential voice, says: ‘There is no cause nor effect in nature; nature has but an individual existence’”(Ibid., 675 quoting Mach 1988, 496/580). His staunch empiricism even led Mach to state the limits of determinism almost like Exner: “No fact of experience repeats itself with absolute accuracy. … Therefore even the extreme theoretical determinist must in practice remain an indeterminist, especially if he does not wish to speculate away the most important discoveries.”(Mach 1991, 282f./208) 
	But Exner’s insight that all laws we experience hold only on average, gives the empiricist law of causality a new twist insofar as it “expresses nothing else but the fact that natural processes, to the extent we can observe them macroscopically, that is on average, are lawful.” (Exner 1922, 674) Nevertheless, Exner objects to Mach’s narrow conception of theory and advocates Boltzmann’s program of explanation instead. “The kind of natural studies which had as its final aim only a description of nature in terms of systems of equations is unsatisfactory. And even if this was in place for a while, today research is directed toward a molecular-mechanical understanding of natural processes.” (Ibid., 721) Facts, according to Exner, are the laws which have “objective reality” (Ibid., 724) while theories change drastically in the course of time. 
	Exner’s stance in the realism issue differs significantly from Boltzmann’s language-oriented ‘empirical realism’ which commences from specifying the meaning of the existence of unicorns, etc. Boltzmann ultimately considered “the realist mode of expression more purposive than the idealist one.” (Boltzmann 1905, 186/75) Exner, on the other hand, does not invoke linguistic considerations and holds that without the assumption “that our sensations are correlated to certain objective processes in the external world…all human research would have to appear superfluous.”(Exner 1922, 287f.) But the fact that we cannot entirely turn down metaphysical questions does not justify us in insisting that the question how clocks ‘really’ tick were meaningful despite relativity theory. Whenever, as in the latter case, we enter a new field of experience, our common habits of thought are not automatically valid and they can easily become an impediment to science.
	Exner focuses on theory reduction and strengthens Boltzmann’s conception of atomism as property ascription to more fundamental entities and their interactions.​[17]​ As no measurement is absolutely precise, the firm empiricist can only impose the following condition upon the elementary mechanisms that underlie an average law. “[I]f physical phenomena result from many identical, mutually independent single events, then the causes assumed by the determinist act just as if there were no causes at all, but mere chance ruling” (Ibid., 681).
	As Exner is seeking an ontological foundation for average laws, he needs a reality criterion that is independent of the particular nature of the single events and consistent with the law of large numbers. His only option here is to accept the collectives of Fechner’s frequency interpretation. Since these are only realized in the limit of infinitely many events, even all apparently deterministic laws admit exceptions – as long as their probability renders them inaccessible to experiment – and they cease to hold below a certain number of single events. On the other hand, the second law of thermodynamics, the probabilistic law par excellence becomes meaningless in microscopic domains.
	More generally, Exner’s fundamental indeterminism intends to justify all types of regularities found in the world. Depending on the number of events studied by the respective science, the degree of probability varies between zero (in most humanities) and one (in physics). All descriptive sciences lie in-between, in particular because the external conditions change too rapidly for exact laws to stabilize. Already in his inaugural address, Exner discusses some regularities outside physics that are expressions of the second law. While, for instance, primitive societies are very homogeneous, “we find an abundant variation in physical, intellectual, and social respects on the part of civilized peoples that increases with the age of the culture”(Exner 1909, 26) because uniformity is a very improbable state.​[18]​
	On August, 3rd, 1914, Planck delivered a rectorial address “On Dynamical and Statistical Regularities” in which he calls for a strict distinction between both types of regularities because of the sharp contrast between reversible, i.e. dynamical, and irreversible processes. 

This dualism which has inevitably been carried into all physical regularities by introducing statistical considerations, to some may appear unsatisfactory, and one has attempted to remove it…by denying absolute certainty and impossibility at all and admitting only higher or lower degrees of probability. Accordingly, there would no longer be any dynamical laws in nature, but only statistical ones; the concept of absolute necessity would at all be abrogated in physics. But such a view should very soon turn out to be a fatal and shortsighted mistake. …(1914, 63)

In these lines Planck reports and rejects precisely Exner’s views, although he does not cite him by name; except for the open polemics with Mach, Planck hardly ever did mention names on similar occasions. 
	Exner responded to Planck point by point in his 94th Lecture. While Exner studies how probabilistic macroscopic laws emerge, Planck assumes a priori the existence of an absolute causality as a necessary precondition for understanding nature. “But nature does not ask whether man understands her or not, nor are we to construe a nature adequate to our understanding, but only to reconcile ourselves as much as possible with the given one.”(Exner 1922, 709) Exner also criticizes Planck’s unjustified trust in our habits of thought which makes it likely “to fall into a sort of physical mythology.” (Ibid., 709)
	His empiricist approach prompts Exner to reject Planck’s distinction between reversible and irreversible processes because in nature we only encounter “irreversible processes which can come, however, arbitrarily close to reversibility”(Ibid., 710) Between the extremes there are many intermediate cases. “Whether a process is reversible or irreversible in fact only depends upon whether the recurrence of a certain state is practically observable.”(Ibid., 711) 
	Exner and Planck also disagree about probability theory. “It is claimed that in its applications probability calculus cannot dispense with the assumption of absolutely dynamical laws for the elementary processes” – here Exner almost quotes (Planck 1914, 64) – “[but] the assumption suffices that the elementary processes be equally characterized by average laws.” (Exner 1922, 712) While Planck calls for a dynamical explanation of statistical laws, Exner, on the contrary, asserts: “Nothing prevents us from regarding the so-called dynamical laws as the ideal limit cases to which the real statistical laws converge for the highest degrees of probability.” (Ibid., 713) And Exner even contemplates that gravitational force might be replaced by a statistical process in which the falling body moves along by fits and starts or even on a zigzag path. “Boltzmann has in conversation entirely agreed to this opinion and has considered it not only possible, but even very probable.” (Ibid., 670) Indeed, in later years Boltzmann studied whether the entropy curve was a non-differentiable function​[19]​ and pondered whether there could be “deviations from the principle of energy, perhaps only of the second law, also from the area law or from the center of mass law.” (Fasol-Boltzmann 1990, 106) The idea of such a discontinuous dynamic was based on his extension of atomism to time that lapses like the pictures in a cinematograph.​[20]​ In a letter to Brentano​[21]​, he even estimated the number of atoms in a second as – a number which grossly exceeds its counterpart for matter, Loschmidt’s or Avogadro’s number 61023. “The number of points of time can be made so great that the probability becomes great that a very improbable condition can occur in the whole world.” (Ibid., 282f.) Thus, in the (presumably finite) Universe there could be regions in which the entropy decreases and time flows backward. Moreover, the “force law must differ at different times.” (Ibid.) Exner generalizes this point and ponders that it would be “presumptuous to claim that any law, for instance, gravity, as it appears to us today, had also been valid in all earlier epochs of the World, or will be valid in all subsequent ones.” (Exner 1922, 667) This had been an old cosmological speculation of Fechner.

3. Frank and von Mises: Underway to Statistical Causality

One of the first philosophical papers of a core member of the later Vienna Circle is Philipp Frank’s “On the Law of Causality and Experience”.

[T]he law of causality, the foundation of every theoretical science, can neither be confirmed nor disproved by experience; not, however, because it is an a priori true necessity of thought, but because it is a purely conventional definition. (Frank 1907, 444/63)

In order to prove his main thesis Frank adapted an argument which the biologist-philosopher Hans Driesch had devised to establish the a priori character of the law of energy conservation. This already suggests that Frank to a certain extent discusses the issue of causality within a Kantian frame of thinking in which the a priori category, however, has been replaced by a convention. And indeed Frank contends that 

the latest philosophy of nature revives in a striking way the basic idea of critical idealism, that experience only serves to fill a framework which man brings along with him as a part of his nature. The difference is that the old philosophers considered this framework a necessary outgrowth of human organization, whereas we see in it a free creation of human arbitrariness. (Ibid., p 447f./66) 

Mach and Boltzmann who are not mentioned in the paper had been considerably more empiricist in that respect. After a short correspondence in October 1893, both had agreed that the law of energy conservation “has no other evidence than an empirical law.” (Höflechner 1994, II 204) 
	In his paper, Frank discusses causality in a form which also involves an induction argument that is rather irrelevant for his line of reasoning. “If, in the course of time, a state of the universe A is once followed by the state B, then whenever A occurs B will follow it.” (Frank 1907, 444/63) The crucial point is the arbitrariness in the definition of ‘state’.

If the law of causality is not valid according to one definition of the state, we redefine the state simply in such a way that the law is valid. If that is the case, however, the law, which appeared to be stating a fact, is transformed into a mere definition of the word ‘state’. (Ibid., 446f./65)

If I wish, I can provide all bodies with state variables that are all qualitatively different, in order to fulfill the law of causality. I can regard heat, electricity, magnetism., as properties of bodies, essentially different from one another, just as is done in modern energetics, and as Driesch does. On the other hand, if I wish, I can get along with less qualitatively different properties. For example, I can introduce only the motion of masses; but then, in order to obtain the necessary diversity, I must take refuge in uncontrollable hidden motions. This leads to the purely mechanical world view, which Democritus dimly conceived as an ideal, and which occurs mostly in the form of atomism. (Ibid., 448/66f.)

In the interpretation of quantum mechanics, arguments similar to Frank’s have become popular. They state that causality could be rescued by adding so-called hidden variables which permit a realist ontology for the quantum particles at the price of adding in-principle unmeasurable quantities. Frank, on the contrary, avoids any ontological commitment – either to Boltzmann’s property ascription to fundamental entities or to Mach’s (qualitatively different) facts. Although he remarks that some world view will be more simple than another, he neither opts for Boltzmann’s ontological simplicity nor for Mach’s principle of economy. 
	Frank’s 1919 paper on “The statistical approach in physics” published in Die Naturwissenschaften​[22]​ further elaborates on the notion of state, however, now within a probabilistic setting. He starts from a definition of the principle of causality that is less contaminated with the problem of induction.

The present state of a closed system of bodies uniquely determines its future state, that is, whenever the systems reaches the state A, a particular state B follows…If one understands by state the sum of all physically measurable properties of the system, the law of causality has no validity. In the sense of molecular theory one must rather add to the description of the state also the positions and velocities of all molecules, by means of which the law of causality is saved, but its actual application becomes impossible. (1919, 727)

Frank’s main justification for the actual invalidity of the law of causality, revoking his earlier radical conventionalist views, comes from Brownian motion. Recall that this phenomenon had also been Boltzmann’s and Exner’s case in point for a genuinely indeterministic physical world. In the theory of gases the number of molecules is typically so large that highly improbable events, such as a spontaneous departure from equilibrium, practically never occur. While for gases the invalidity of causality is only theoretically inferred, in Brownian motion we observe these spontaneous density fluctuations, so that Frank concludes: “in the realm of the empirical-physical, the experimentally measurable quantities … there exists no causality.” (Ibid., 728) It remains, however, possible to establish an average law, Smoluchowski’s law of diffusion for the Brownian particle. 
	Frank bases the law of causality exclusively on the prediction of a future state and he interestingly does not require that it refer to genuine laws. This becomes clear when he extends his considerations – as Exner had done – to the humanities which study properties that are considerably less detailed than those of statistical mechanics. 

The law of causality does not require at all the existence of historical laws. It might well be that the properties by which the historian describes groups of nations do not suffice in principle to fulfill the law of causality, and that there exists no historical, but only an individual psychological causality. (Ibid., 728)

Frank’s outline of the “statistical conception of nature” (Ibid. 701) shares the core tenet of Vienna Indeterminism, the separation of causality and ontology. One should not be led astray by terminology. As does Planck, he classifies only dynamical laws admitting unique predictions as causal, but he does not demand that statistical laws should be reduced to dynamical ones because, after all, Brownian motion empirically teaches that this is impossible. Yet, this evidence had been precisely Exner’s empiricist rationale in the polemics with Planck. Exner had, more generally, considered the very fact that all natural processes are directed as the starting point of our understanding of nature and the second law of thermodynamics as the basic law of nature. Right at the beginning of his paper, Frank characterizes “the tendency of assimilating all distinctions” as the most characteristic trait of natural processes and as a “brazen law” (Ibid., 701) that originates in a game of chance. For this result he credits Boltzmann and Marian von Smoluchowski, a former student of Exner’s. Despite these similarities, Frank does not subscribe to so radical a probabilism as Exner. And although he obviously applies the frequency interpretation, he does not yet derive clear-cut ontological consequences from that.
	Let me turn to the role of Mach within Frank’s early thinking. In 1910, the same year in which he had visited Mach to explain to him Minkowski’s formulation of special relativity, he reviewed for the Monatshefte​[23]​ Planck’s Leiden lecture. There he holds that Planck’s attack essentially has arisen from various misunderstandings. In particular, one could simultaneously maintain that our world view is an arbitrary creation and that this, nonetheless, reflects natural processes independent from us. The real conflict, according to Frank, lies in the fact that – unlike Mach – Planck assumes that our present physical world-view possesses some lasting traits. The reviewer rightly holds that even Mach would consider energy conservation as real, once the quantities of all the single energies have been specified. As a general law, however, it is merely a convention whereas Planck considers it as the most important guiding principle. In a review of a new edition of Planck’s classical historical and systematic study on The Principle of Energy Conservation (Planck, 1913), Frank is even more direct. To an argument of Planck in favor of the empirical character of the general law he retorts: “There is still a breach through which the skillfully expelled ‘conventionalism’ can intrude into this [general] form of the energy law and this lies in the concept of ‘the same state’.”(1916, 18) The reviewer also rejects introducing metaphysical realism as a guiding postulate; “it is even less admissible to repeat now what had happened with God, freedom, and immortality in favor of atoms and electrons.” (1910, 47) 
	Both reviews form the basis of Frank’s commemorative article on “The importance for Our Times of Ernst Mach’s Philosophy of Science” which lies, according to the author, in Mach’s having adapted the great project of Enlightenment to the present. As a main tenet of Enlightenment philosophy Frank considers “the protest against the misuse of merely auxiliary concepts” (1917, 70/80) as an absolute foundation of physics and philosophy, because this bears the danger of conceiving any change in the foundations of physical theory as a bankruptcy of the scientific world conception as such. Of course, each epoch creates its own auxiliary concepts which may in turn transcend their own domain of definition. “The work of Mach is therefore not essentially destructive,…but on the contrary it is an attempt to create an unassailable position for physics” (Ibid., 68/75) despite the constant change of theories. Not entire parts of theories, as Planck held, will become lasting truths, but only the functional dependences between the phenomena will remain – the direct descriptions in Mach’s terminology. 

The known connections among phenomena form a network; the theory seeks to pass a continuous surface through the knots and threads of the net. Naturally, the smaller the meshes, the more closely is the surface fixed by the net. Hence, as our experience progresses the surface is permitted less and less play, without ever being unequivocally determined by the net. (Ibid., 66/72)

A later quotation from Poincaré might suggest that Frank is heading towards a sort of structural realism based on Mach’s functional dependences. Yet he does not posit any analog of Mach’s principle of uniqueness in order to guarantee the integrity of the facts constituted by this network. Instead, he affirms that all our theories are empirically underdetermined and contain an irreducible conventional element.
	In his article, Frank also takes a stand on atomism. Emphasizing that Mach above all strove after concepts that were applicable in all sciences, he concludes:

I will not deny that Mach allowed himself to be misled by this argument into attacking the use of atomistics in physics more sharply than can be justified. After all, the usefulness of the atomic theories in this limited realm is certainly indisputable. His followers, as is generally the case, often saw in this weakness of the master his greatest strength…I believe that one can completely free the nucleus of Mach’s teachings from this historically and individually conditioned aversion to atomistics. (Ibid., 68f./77f.)

Let me now turn to von Mises. Still in his 1922 article “On the Present Crises of Mechanics”, he appeared almost as an orthodox Machian. Von Mises starts out by distinguishing two strands of mechanics which differ in content, not just in method. ‘Bound mechanics’ contains all mechanical problems in the classical physical sense which can be subsumed under a single variational principle. ‘Free mechanics’ denotes all theories which are consistent with the wider framework of Newton’s axioms and which are specified by arbitrary force functions. Also general relativity, von Mises continues, seems to be expressible as a part of free mechanics, but the force functions admitted are of a highly restricted type. 

It seems to us that the mechanics of relativity is much more absolute or ‘absolutistic’ than the usual one, ‘more bound’ in our words…Perhaps here one finds part of the reasons which have induced Ernst Mach in his posthumous ‘Optics’ to reject relativity theory so firmly from the standpoint of experience (1922, 26).

Whether Mach really wrote the infamous preface or not,​[24]​ von Mises touches upon the absolute character of the metric which for Planck marks a main virtue of relativity theory. Von Mises also stubbornly sticks to Mach’s classical terminology concerning atoms, while Frank already in 1917 had attempted to detach Mach’s epistemology from that. 

I want to clearly emphasize that I do not think of hypothetical molecules, electrons, -particles and the like, but that I have in mind only phenomena of motion and equilibrium at sensorily perceptible masses. (Ibid., 28)

Indeed, von Mises studies the main question of his article, to wit, whether the framework of ‘free mechanics’ suffices to explain all observable phenomena of motion and equilibrium, at purely classical examples. Both turbulence phenomena in liquid media and Brownian motion teach that no satisfactory result can be obtained unless one resorts to statistical methods which, in the first case, yield a phenomenological theory whose degenerate system of equations “provides the welcome opportunity to adapt the theory to observations.” (Ibid., 27) While in this case von Mises argues almost like an engineer, in the case of Brownian motion he takes the position of a methodological purist and charges the theories of Einstein and Smoluchowski for 

the intolerable contradiction that the course of events at one time was considered as uniquely determined by physical or mechanical laws, while one subsequently believed to be able to reach results about this course from a completely different angle. This contradiction particularly comes to light in Boltzmann’s version of the kinetic theory of gases (which, however, deals with the hypothetical molecules and not with observable masses, so that it can serve only as an analogy here) where one calculates first the velocity changes according to the laws of elastic scattering and then thwarts these calculations by purely statistical considerations. (Ibid., 29)

In kinetic gas theory this connection between the deterministic microlevel and the probabilistic macrolevel is established by “the notorious ergodic hypothesis.” (Ibid., 29) It is instead more coherent to pursue a thoroughly probabilistic approach. As in Exner’s case, the frequentist account of probability permits von Mises even to furnish the probabilistic laws with a suitable ontology, to wit, mass phenomena which become an independent object of physical theorizing in the same vein as Newtonian point particles.

Probability calculus is part of theoretical physics in the same way as classical mechanics or optics, it is an entirely self-contained theory of certain phenomena, the so-called mass phenomena, irrespective of whether they are of mechanical, electric or other nature. (Ibid., 28)

This calculus maps initial probabilities, which play the combined role of the force functions and initial values of ‘free mechanics’, into other probabilities without ever yielding deterministic results about single processes. The burden of finding and verifying these probability distributions remains with the empirical sciences. Thus, statistical physics “never directly competes with a result of mechanics or of the rest of deterministic physics.”(Ibid., 28) 
	By attributing to probability calculus its own domain of facts, mass phenomena, von Mises can maintain the strict separation between deterministic physics and statistical physics. This avoids Exner’s radical outlook that, presumably, all deterministic laws are really indeterministic. Von Mises’ compartimentation of physical ontology seems to be the price paid for his staunch rejection of atomism and his continuous criticism of Boltzmann. Despite his friend Frank’s references to Exner, von Mises even in later years reads Boltzmann much more in the Berlin fashion than as a Vienna Indeterminist. This makes him overlook many Machian traits in Boltzmann’s and Exner’s radical probabilism. Nevertheless, von Mises employs all pertinent arguments, firm empiricism and the rejection of any a priori category of causality foremost. As did the empiricist Exner, he considers Brownian motion as a decisive case in point for the unavoidability of indeterminism in this factual domain.

It is entirely irrelevant whether we stick to the assumption that the orbits would be determined if we knew the exact initial conditions and all influences; since we have no prospect of ever achieving this knowledge, this is an assumption of which it can never be decided whether it is true or not, hence an unscientific one. (Ibid., 29)

Mises quite generally believes that such unanswerable questions could be excluded in the course of scientific progress. This already hints at how centrally the issue of language will figure in his later philosophy (1939).
	In his inaugural address Exner had considered the law of large numbers as the empirical meta-law basic to all science. This law indeed represents a characteristic trait of the frequentist theory of probability, and in von Mises’ first rigorous formulation of the theory it becomes the first axiom about collectives. In the same year when he published the mature version of his theory, von Mises took the occasion to apply his theory to refute the philosopher Karl Marbe’s claim that probabilistically distributed events harbor an inherent tendency of equilibration. Mises commences his 1919 paper by distinguishing concept formation in philosophy, which starts out from everyday language, and in the sciences, which rest upon exact but arbitrary definitions within a partially or fully axiomatized theory. Thus ‘probability’ in everyday parlance, our subjective degree of certainty, is sharply distinct from its mathematical homonym. 
	Von Mises’ definition of probability as the limit of the relative frequency of a property within an infinite series presupposes that this series forms a collective. There are two conditions for a collective: (i) The relative frequencies of the occurrence of the property converge to a limit. (ii) “If out of the whole series of elements one forms a subseries without using the differences between the properties in the subseries to be selected, then within this subseries the relative frequencies for the occurrence of the properties possess the same limits as for the whole series.” (Mises 1919, 171) This second condition is called the ‘irregularity of coordination’ or the ‘impossibility of a gambling system’. 
	According to von Mises, the first condition is based on our manifold experience that in lotteries, birth rates, etc. the relative frequencies become more and more stable as the observed series gets longer. Still in those days empirical investigations into such simple phenomena were very common; Frank (1919, 704f.), for instance, reports in detail a statistical investigation of the number of pedestrians within a small strip of the sidewalk. Since Poisson, the empirical fact of the convergence of relative frequencies is often called the law of large numbers. But, as von Mises demonstrates in a later paper that is largely identical with a part in Probability, Statistics and Truth​[25]​, this terminology is ambiguous because Poisson also used it for a particular mathematical theorem that generalizes a result of Jacob Bernoulli. This states that the probability p for an experiment repeated n times to lie within [pn-n, pn+n] ( a small positive number) converges to 1 as n. Von Mises now shows that if one stays within the realm of classical a priori probabilities, this theorem is of purely algebraical nature and does not permit any conclusion about actual experiments. Adopting the frequency interpretation, however, it yields a valuable statement about “the order of the experimental results” (1927, 501) or “about the course of the phenomena” (Ibid., 502) that transcends the empirical law of large numbers which had only concerned the existence of the limit. In order to derive Poisson’s theorem, one has to assume the irregularity condition. While in his 1919 paper he had argued that this axiom is hardly accessible to direct empirical observations, but derives its empirical support mainly from the manifold experimental corroborations of the multiplication rule of probability which can be derived from it, he now provides a direct analogy from physics:

As modern physics has deduced from the failed attempts to construe for centuries a perpetuum mobile the valuable energy law or the principle of the excluded perpetuum mobile, so we have to avail ourselves of the experiences of the system players in the casinos. (Mises, 1927, 501)​[26]​

The analogy presupposes a Machian reading of the principle of energy conservation as empirical and contradicts Frank’s 1907 conventionalist account. Moreover, it runs counter to Planck’s idea of the de-anthropomorphization of scientific concepts according to which both perpertua mobilia had been replaced by the respective principles of energy conservation and entropy increase.
	While in the “Crises of Mechanics” von Mises (1922) considers probability theory on a par with mechanics and attributes to it its own domain of facts, in 1919 he was still holding that in the application to theoretical physics “the connection between probability theory and reality is not so immediate [as in games of chance or population statistics] because theories of physical nature lie between them.” (1919, 173) Instead he compares probability calculus to geometry because probabilities are calculated from given probabilities; but “the determination of the initial collectives of the calculation does not belong to the tasks of probability calculus in the narrow sense.” (Ibid., 175) Similarly the procedures of determining the base length and the angles of the triangles do not belong to geodesy itself. Pure geometry, he continues, corresponds to the games of chance. 
	Von Mises’ analogy was not so far-fetched because since Hilbert’s sixth problem (1900, 272f.), geometry was considered as the pattern of axiomatizing an empirical theory, and Hilbert already there had explicitly suggested the axiomatization of probability theory in order to attain a rigorous formulation of the theory of gases. As for both Mach and Hilbert geometry was undoubtedly an empirical science, it was only a short step for von Mises to subsequently consider mass phenomena as the ontology suitable not only for societal, but also for physical probabilities.​[27]​ His 1919 paper still envisages probability theory predominantly from the mathematical side and leaves the specification of the probability distributions and statistical collectives to the empirical sciences. But in 1922 he would find that this question was decisive for the scientific import of probability calculus and for an ontology suitable to statistical physics – even more after quantum mechanics had won favor by the end of the decade.
	When on September, 16th, 1929, Frank and von Mises opened the Prague biennial meeting of the German Physical Society, most physicists of the younger generation were already deeply convinced that quantum mechanics required to give a final farewell to well-entrenched methodological convictions. As president of the regional society and as chair of the local organizing committee,​[28]​ Frank arranged in conjunction with the conference a meeting on “Epistemology of the Exact Sciences” co-organized by the Vienna Circle and the Berlin Society for Scientific Philosophy. At this meeting the Vienna Circle went public with its famous manifesto. A major topic of this meeting and of the first volume of Erkenntnis was probability theory; papers by Reichenbach, Friedrich Waismann, and Herbert Feigl were followed by an extensive discussion​[29]​ which clearly showed the rift between Reichenbach and von Mises. Since these contributions contain various intermediate positions as to whether our degrees of certainty represent genuine probabilities, I briefly mention only one major criticism of Reichenbach’s that is of relevance for the demarcation of Vienna Indeterminism because it touches upon von Mises’ comparison between probability calculus and geometry. Reichenbach argues that 

in the coordination of a physical body to a mathematical theory the notion of approximation occurs which contains the concept of probability…: within certain limits these physical objects correspond with high probability to the mathematical axioms. Thus, the problem of coordination itself contains the concept of probability. It is true, in geometry one is allowed to separate the coordination problem from the mathematical theory because the coordination problem does not contain any geometrical concept; in probability theory however the concept constituted by this theory enters itself into the coordination problem: this is the logical particularity of the problem of probability. (Erkenntnis 1, 275) 

Von Mises, to the contrary, considers the collective as an ideal concept, and the question “whether an empirically given series represents a collective…does not constitute a problem within probability calculus.” (Ibid., 272) He insists “that approximation and statistics are not to be confused with one another.” (Ibid., 280) Strictly in line with Hilbert’s program of the axiomatization of the sciences he even extends his analogy and asserts that by “modifying the axiom of disorder…one can obtain another probability calculus in the same sense as there is an Euclidean and a non-Euclidean geometry.”(Ibid., p 280)
	The main source of disagreement seems to me von Mises’ firm empiricism according to which there cannot be any difference between the observed and the existing that would require a probabilistic theory of approximative correspondence. On the ontological side, Mach, Boltzmann, and Exner’s insistence upon the individual existence of the world and, accordingly, the rejection of possible-world arguments blocks – or at least makes very unattractive to frequentists such as Frank and von Mises – Reichenbach’s probabilistic reasoning concerning coordination. Against this backdrop it is not surprising that Mach’s principle of unique determination resurges in Frank’s broad insistence on the uniqueness of coordination. In both cases uniqueness does not contradict conventionalism because coordination is not one-to-one: also other theories could uniquely map experiences into experiences.
	According to Frank’s recollections (1961, 49), his opening address to the Prague congress “intended to give the scientists a kind of preview of our ideas and to prove that the new line of philosophy [Logical Empiricism] is the necessary result of the new trends in physics.” If after these changes physicists still refuse to address anew those philosophical questions, they will almost certainly relapse into ‘school philosophy’ which does not pose any limit on questions about the ‘real’ position and momentum of quantum particles. But, “beside the relativity theory and quantum mechanics there cannot exist a philosophy that contains a fossilization of the earlier physical theories.” (Frank 1929, 991/119) to wit, the classical world view of Newtonian mechanics which yielded both the exalted optimism expressed in Laplace’s demon and the unjustified pessimism of Emil du Bois-Reymond’s Ignorabimus. Frank in particular criticizes the naive correspondence theory of truth in which he conceives the common tenet of the various heavily conflicting directions of ‘school philosophy’. This conception yields unmeasurable and unexperiencable, but nevertheless existing properties. “Since, on the other hand, the doctrines of the school philosophy in the field of mechanical phenomena require strict determinism, one is forced to assume for the motion of the electron some mystical vital causes.” (Ibid., 973/102) Against all this Frank asserts:

The task of physics is only to find symbols among which there exist rigorously valid relations, and which can be assigned uniquely to our experiences. This correspondence between experiences and symbols may be more or less detailed. If the symbols conform to the experiences in a very detailed manner we speak of causal laws; if the correspondence is of a broader sort we call the laws statistical. I do not believe that a more exact analysis will establish a definite distinction here. We know today that with the help of positions and velocities we cannot set up any causal laws for single electrons. This does not exclude the possibility, however, that we shall perhaps some day find a set of quantities with the help of which it will be possible to describe the behavior of these particles in greater detail than by means of the wave function, the probabilities. (Ibid., 992f./123)

Let me elaborate on two aspects of Frank’s summary. First, what conclusion can we draw from the fact that the values of Planck’s constant h observed in black-body radiation and in atomic spectra agree? To Planck’s mind, this marks a clear sign that we have successfully moved up one step in the ladder from the relative to the absolute because after we had given up simultaneously precise positions and momenta we gained a new absolute constant. On Frank’s account, this agreement of various determinations of Planck’s constant does not warrant any metaphysical inference, but it permits us to uniquely define h as a symbol in physical theory. But since every measurement is the comparison of an object theory with the theory of the measurement apparatus, the experience of uniqueness in a measurement has consequences. “Every verification of a physical theory consists in the test of whether the symbols assigned by the theory to the experiences are unique.” (Ibid., 987/111)
	Second, Frank’s account of experience and theory could be pictured like a commuting diagram in geometry between symbols at t0 and t1 and the respective experiences. This suggests that statistical features enter in two places which are, however, strongly correlated: in coordination (or assignment) and in the law. In the above quotation Frank takes Exner’s stand against Planck and asserts that the distinction between deterministic and statistical laws is at best a gradual one. This, however, does not entail Reichenbach’s point of view, because Frank rejects the idea that experiences were not unique, but only an ensemble over which we put a probability distribution during the process of coordination. Instead Frank uses the distinction between the macro- and the microlevel to argue that collectives (or more precisely: objects derived from them) correspond to single experiences and, accordingly, represent a possible ontology for physical laws that map probabilities into probabilities. “For these probabilities (the squares of the absolute values of the wave functions) Schrödinger in his wave mechanics, sets up rigorous causal laws. To the probabilities that occur in these laws and define the state of the system one can therefore assign definite experiences.” (1929, 992/122)​[30]​ In his 1932 book on causality, Frank expressed this importance of the coordination rule in a different wording that meanwhile had become current in quantum mechanics: “Each formulation of the law of causality even contains ‘interpretation’ as an essential part.”(1932, 235) So as Exner held, strict macro-laws for collectives emerge from chance. But Frank emphasizes that quantum mechanics might not be the final word because the idea of ‘absolute chance’, or of an irrational element in science, presents itself only to the advocate of ‘school philosophy’ and does not make any sense within the scientific world conception.
	Following Frank’s talk, von Mises (1930) explained to the Prague congress that this change towards a statistical ontology is rooted in a modified attitude to causality. It is rather easy, von Mises begins, to rephrase any statistical law in such a manner that it conforms to Kant’s very general definitions of causality. Thus, the principle of causality is not a necessity of thought, “but changeable, and it will subordinate itself to the demands of physics.” (1930, 146) For this reason causality does not provide an adequate basis to assess the more relevant distinction between determinism and indeterminism, or between the description of nature by means of differential equations and by means of probabilities. Von Mises returns to his earlier considerations about classical mechanics and states that Laplace’s demon could act properly only as long as the force laws are not too complex.

Newtonian mechanics only provides a useful means of causal explanation of nature as long as relatively simple force laws entail more complex motions… Explanation just means reducing to something more simple. (Ibid., 146)

The deterministic approaches of classical physics can be maintained formally, or better: ideally, in the entire realm of directly observable phenomena, but in many cases…they become idle, they lose the character of a causal explanation, they do not contribute to our knowledge, to describing or predicting the course of phenomena.…For those who comprehend these concepts [occurring in physical theories] only as means introduced in the approaches based on differential equations in order to jointly enable an orientation in the phenomenal world, the limits of applicability and the limits of determinism itself coincide. (Ibid., 147) 

Once again we find Mach’s empiricism at the root of the indeterministic approach. More precisely than in his earlier papers, von Mises studies the difference between the macro- and the microlevel. Hydrodynamics, Brownian motion and Boltzmann’s various attempts to provide a mechanical foundation of the kinetic theory all show that “[t]he transition between the physics of the single elementary body, atom, proton, electron, etc. to the macroscopic phenomena simply is obtained only by statistics.” (Ibid., 148) If one consequently adopts a purely statistical approach the notorious ergodic hypothesis becomes a solvable mathematical problem. Although the time evolutions themselves do not form a collective, and, accordingly, the original concept of probability cannot be carried over to them, the law of large numbers (in the general sense) can be applied to the time evolutions. 






Quotations are based on German originals and translations are usually mine. But where translations already existed or even were published during authors’ lifetime, I have tried to follow them as long as it was not necessary to restore a terminological continuity between different authors in the German originals. References contain both the page number of the German original and (after a ‘/’) the page number of the indicated English translations.
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^1	  From Boltzmann’s notebook for the philosophy lectures (Fasol-Boltzmann 1990, 280).
^2	  Cf. (Kuhn 1987). Planck wrote on philosophical matters only after 1908. His own interpretation of the 1900 discovery, to wit, that he had obtained a new constant of nature, did not significantly change thereafter. Hence the most contested point of Kuhn’s book, whether Planck actually thought about a quantum theory from the very beginning is irrelevant for the scope of the present paper. 
^3	  (Blackmore 1995a, 133 note 18) asserts “that some caution is in order” because Frank was almost 80 years old at the time of the interview.
^4	  To most remarks concerning Mach and Boltzmann made in the sequel, see this paper for further details.
^5	  See (Fasol-Boltzmann, 1990, 159) and the letter to Felix Klein given in (Höflechner, 1994, II270).
^6	  See the quotation at the beginning of Sec. 2 below.
^7	  One may add here that on Exner’s suggestion the Austrian Academy of Science founded one of the most important institutes for the early research in radioactivity, see (Karlik and Schmid 1982). During the 1920s also Prague was a very active place in atomic and nuclear physics, see (Stöltzner 1995).
^8	  Cf. also Exner’s picture of Loschmidt in (Exner 1921).
^9	  Cf. the bibliography in the English translation of (Frank, 1932), 290-296.
^10	  Note that before Gödel’s rotating universe of 1949 no causality-violating solution of the theory was known, such that one could hope to always find such a hypersurface that admits a causal dynamics.
^11	  Already in 1873 Boltzmann (1905, 11) praised Maxwell’s electrodynamics for providing a touchstone for further experimentation while its competitors only reach as far as the phenomena are known.
^12	  Here I cannot make sense from the shorthand text other than changing ‘entstehen’ (originate, emerge) into ‘stehen’. See (Blackmore 1905a, 169) for a translation of the entire note.
^13	  See (Mach 1919, 381/351) and (Boltzmann 1905, 154/53 note 9) where he frankly admits his ignorance. Mach’s interpretation that the maximization of probability in the second law arises from the tendency toward stability represents also a main target when Planck (1910) rightly charges Mach of conflating both laws of thermodynamics. 
^14	  Michael Heidelberger, private communication. Indeed both contexts of Fechner’s indeterminism listed in (Heidelberger 1993, 338-353), “Freedom and Physiology” and “Epigenesis and Philosophy of History”, were quite extraneous for Boltzmann. His preparatory notes for the philosophy lectures do not mention Fechner either, cf. (Fasol-Boltzmann 1990, 13).
^15	  On the multifarious relation between Fechner and Herbart which was by no means a simple opposition, see (Heidelberger 1993).
^16	  All Vienna Indeterminists avoided the terms “Geisteswissenschaften” and later “humanities” the meanings of which do not coincide but equally suggest a fundamental methodological division of the scientific disciplines. The title if Exner’s speech “Humanistik” apparently tries a way out by a very uncommon term referring to the tradition of the classics. I have recently (Stöltzner 2002b) translated this – admittedly as queer as the German original – as “humanistics”; for the origin of the word “humanities” see (Hiebert 2000, 10 fn.) who places the inaugural address within a broad tendency “in which probability and chance, as generated from within the social and humanistic disciplines, came to inspire and motivate investigators in the physical science to take a deeper look (deeper than classical mechanics allows) at processes that occur in nature.” (Ibid., 7)
^17	  Paul A. Hanle holds that on the basis of Exner’s indeterminism “we cannot in principle apply any mechanistic program of physics to molecular processes”(Hanle 1979, 256) while this was the case with Boltzmann’s. But Hanle simply misunderstands Boltzmann’s concept of atomism as if it relapsed into mechanical or deterministic explanation. As Exner discusses his fundamental indeterminism in connection with the example of Brownian motion, Hanle criticizes his “failure to distinguish between indeterminacy in principle and the practical inability to analyze the determinate causes in an aggregation of micro-physical events.”(Ibid., 227) Here Hanle does not appraise the ontological consequences of the frequentist interpretation of probability (see below) and Exner’s downright empiricism.
^18	  By the time of his death, Exner was working over a compendious study on the history of culture titled From Chaos to Present that would elaborate his physicalist and indeterminist approach to the humanities. See (Stöltzner 2002) for a detailed discussion of this theory.
^19	  See his correspondence with Felix Klein (Höflechner 1994, II 277-280) and (Boltzmann 1898).
^20	 Cf. (Fasol-Boltzmann 1990, 105).
^21	  See (Höflechner 1994, II384) and (Blackmore 1995a, 125) where one finds translations of many letters and large part of the lectures.
^22	  As stated in the introduction, the following papers have all appeared in this magazine.
^23	  The Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik was the house organ of the Institute of Mathematics of the University of Vienna. So it is quite natural that Frank and Hahn published there several Literaturberichte (reviews) but apparently Uebel (2000) was the first to notice this. 
^24	  There exists an extensive literature as to whether the preface of the Optics was forged, as Gereon Wolters claims, and what, more generally, was Mach’s late position on relativity theory; see (Wolters 1987) and (Holton 1989).
^25	  To wit, the first half of the fourth lecture in the German original (Mises 1936, 129-143).
^26	  This analogy also appears in (Mises 1930, 148).
^27	  Interestingly, von Mises (1939) was very critical about Hilbert’s axiomatic method. In a recent paper (2002a) I have argued that Hahn and Frank identified Hilbert’s axiomatization program as professing the faith of a Leibnizian pre-established harmony between mathematics and the empirical sciences, a bridge which contradicted their rigid separation between analytical and empirical statements. To my mind, a similar case can be made with respect to von Mises. Recent work on Hilbert (Corry 1997, Majer 2002, Stöltzner 2002a) shows that such an account misrepresents Hilbert’s intentions which were of methodological kind and not tied to ontological reductionism. This is not to say that he did not overstate reductionism and universality at some places. 
^28	  As outlined in (Stöltzner, 1995), the German University at Prague and Frank personally were well embedded into the physical life of the German-speaking world. Additionally, it was quite common to accept philosophically oriented talks on meetings of the society, but there were never two such talks placed so prominently in an opening session. Frank’s dramaturgy ended the morning session on the “Kleine Bühne” with a talk of Arnold Sommerfeld – not quite a positivist – on “Some principal remarks concerning wave mechanics”. This underlines to what extent quantum mechanics already dominated the scene.
^29	  Together with von Mises’ congress speech, all papers were published in Erkenntnis 1: 159-285.
^30	  In the German original, Frank writes “frequencies” instead of “probabilities”.
